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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: PELL v.
PROCUNIER AND SAXBE v.
WASHINGTON POST CO.
by Lawrence K. Rockwell*
It would be difficult to overstate the important role the press has
played in the scenario of American history.1 From the calling of the
colonies to arms and the winning of independence from England,2 to the
present exposures of incidents of corruption in government and the Wat-
ergate trials,3 the press has established itself as an influential and power-
ful entity in American political life.
News is defined as "[a] report of a recent event; information about
something before unknown; fresh tidings; recent intelligence."4 Al-
though the motivation of the press in gathering and presenting news to
the general public may depend in some part upon the political view-
point5 or economic status6 of the owner, editor or reporter of the particu-
lar medium, it may safely be asserted as did James Madison that:
* Member, second year class.
1. The question of who constitutes the press is not important for the purposes of
this note. Therefore, this note shall utilize the definition of who comprises the news
media which is provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT No. 1220.6/7300.96, INMATE CORRESPONDENCE
INTERVIEws WITH REPREsENTATIVES OF THE PRESS AND NEWS MEDIA, § 4(a) (1),
June 10, 1974. Representatives of the news media are: "lplersons who are substan-
tially employed in the business of gathering or reporting news for (a) a newspaper quali-
fying as a general circulation newspaper in the community to which it publishes, (b)
news magazines having a substantially national circulation being sold by newsstands to
the general public and by mail circulation, (c) national or international news services
(d) radio and television news programs of stations holding Federal Communication
Commission Licenses."
2. See L. LEvy, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY
193-94 (1963); J. TEBBEL, CONACT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER 35 (1963).
3. See, e.g., B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
4. WEBsran's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1648
(2d unabr. 1959).
5. The press in early American history served primarily as a vehicle for partisan
politics. See W. CHENERY, FREEDOM OF TIL PRESS 143-45 (1955); F. MoT, AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 113-14 (3d ed. 1962). In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
the press was a major force in exposing dangerous and unhealthy conditions forced upon
the American public by industry. See, e.g., UPTON SINCLAIR, Tm JUNGLE (Airmont
Publishing Co. 1965). More recently, the press has been attacked as being comprised
primarily of political liberals. This political composition allegedly slants the press' re-
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[T]o the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the world is in-
debted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason
and humanity over error and oppression; . . . to the same benefi-
cient source the United States owe much of the lights which con-
ducted them to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and
which have improved their political system into a shape so aus-
picious to their happiness. 7
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Pell v. Procuniers and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.,9 presented the Court with the opportunity to con-
sider the constitutional foundation upon which an effective press rests,
namely the right of the press to gather information.10 It is important to
recognize that the right to know consists of both the right to gather infor-
mation and the right to receive information." If either the right to gather
or to receive information is restricted the right to know will be cur-
tailed. In Pell v. Procunier the Court held that California prison regu-
lations prohibiting all personal interviews by the press with specific in-
mates did not violate the constitutional rights of the press.' 2 The Court
porting to the general public. See E. EFRoN, THE NEWS TWISTERS (1971). Former
Vice President Spiro Agnew was perhaps the most prominent and outspoken individual
to voice this claim. Id. at 133-42. Agnew, in one of his many speeches critical of news-
men, attacked their "instant analysis" and "querulous criticism" with regard to an ad-
dress by former President Nixon on the subject of Vietnam. 115 CoNG. REc. 34,043
(1969). Robert Bartley, the editorial-page editor of the Wall Street Journal, has as-
serted that "[ojur [the press'] function is to provide the reader with understanding
." ASPEN NOTEOOK ON GovERNMENT AND THE MEIrA 89 (W. Rivers & M. Ny-
han eds. 1973). News agencies claim to be devoted to presenting the most nonpartisan
reporting possible. The wide political'spectrum encompassed by the subscribers to these
services aids in promoting this end. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U.S.
103, 131 (1936). See K. CoOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNow 27-38 (1956).
6. The commercial nature of the press may inevitably lead to accommodation by
the press with the views of an advertiser if the member of the press relies on a given
advertiser for a sufficiently large portion of its financial existence. See Barron, Access
to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HIv. L. Rnv. 1641, 1661 (1967);
GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL, MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SocIETY 23-
24 (1973).
7. 4 MADisoN's WORKS, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA REsOLUTIONS 544, in Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
8. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
9. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
10. The Court has expressly acknowledged the existence of this right. See Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972).
11. The First Amendment "necessarily protects the right to receive [information]."
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See cases cited note 88 infra.
12. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
Stewart and Rehnquist comprised the majority. The dissenting opinions considered Pell
and Saxbe together as to this issue. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 836. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opin-
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also held that the First Amendment rights of the inmates desiring inter-
views with a willing press were not violated by such regulations.!'
Along similar lines, the Court in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.14 held
that federal regulations prohibiting all press interviews with any federal
prisoners violated no rights of the press plaintiffs.
This note focuses on the issue common to the Pell and Saxbe cases:
does a total ban on personal interviews with specific willing inmates by
the press unconstitutionally abridge the First Amendment freedom of
the press guarantee?'5 The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the
evolution of the press' character and role in American society argues for
the reasoning adopted by the dissenters on that issue.
After a brief introduction to the facts of the cases, the majority
opinions in Pell and Saxbe will be examined. This discussion is followed
by a consideration of Justice Powell's and Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinions. Next, the evolution of the press' character and role in Ameri-
can society and past statements by the Court in this regard are examined.
The final portion of this note evaluates how change in the character and
role of the press supports the dissenters' position, rather than the ma-
jority view, for a press that is a viable means of the public exercising
its First Amendment right to gather information.
The Factual Situations of Pell and Saxbe
As they related to the claims of the press plaintiffs in each case, the
facts of Pell and Saxbe were somewhat similar. In Pell, representatives of
the news media requested of the proper correctional officials permission
for face-to-face interviews with specific inmates at the San Quentin State
Penitentiary in California. Each inmate whom the press desired to inter-
view had previously consented to the interview. The requests of-the news
media representatives, however, were all denied pursuant to section
415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual which
stated: "Press and other media interviews with specific individual in-
mates will not be permitted."' 6 The media plaintiffs then sued to enjoin
ion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974).
13. 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974). On this issue Justice Powell joined the majority.
Justice Douglas wrote a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 836.
14. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
15. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of .. . the press.
." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
16. This regulation was adopted August 23, 1971, and has been modified by Cali-
fornia Dep't of Corrections Administrative Manual § 415.16, Nov. 6, 1974. Interviews
with specific inmates are now allowed with permission of the warden or superintendant.
There are, however, several restrictions. Interviews may be prohibited when they would,
in the opinion of the warden or superintendant, jeopardize the "safety and good order"
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the enforcement of the regulation. 17 Finding no violation of the media
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, the three-judge" s district court
granted the motion of the state of California to dismiss the claims of the
media plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "the press").19 In a direct
appeal from this decision to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
affirmed the district court as to this issue. 20
In Saxbe a reporter for the Washington Post newspaper requested
permission to have face-to-face interviews with certain inmates at two
federal penitentiaries, Lewisburg and Danbury. The reporter was de-
nied permission for the interviews on the authority of section 4b(6) of
the Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons which read:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual
inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or
seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted
with inmates whose identity is not made public, if it is limited to
discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities.21
of the institution. Interviews may also be denied if they would be "detrimental to the
welfare and best interests of the inmate." Only one interview every six months per in-
mate is allowed unless approved by the Director of Corrections. Interviews are not per-
mitted with inmates while they are in isolation or segregation or for a "reasonable time"
after they are returned from parole.
17. Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
18. The three judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281,
2284 (1970).
19. Hillery v. Procunier, 364 'F. Supp. 196 (1973). The court's consideration of
the press' claim was brief. The court repeated the statement in Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972), that the press enjoys no greater right of access to informa-
tion than the general public. The court found this rationale utilized in Seattle-Tacoma
Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973). The court in
Hillery viewed that case as controlling the press claims. The regulation in that case,
however, only prohibited press interviews with willing inmates at a federal maximum
security institution. The court in Hillery distinguished the decision in Washington Post
Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972) on the ground that the regulation
there banned all interviews rather than just ones with specific inmates. The result in
Washington Post Co. was viewed by the court in Hillery as not inconsistent with its
decision because in Washington Post Co. the press was given only some access to in-
mates and not a special right of access. This distinction does not withstand analysis
because the granting of some access was a grant of special access ris-a-vis the general
public. This was the very result the court in Hillery found constitutionally unwarranted
because of Branzburg v. Hayes.
20. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
21. U.S. DEP'T or JUsTIcE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT 1220.1A, IN-
MATE CORRESPONDENC WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS AND NEws MEDIA, Feb.
11, 1972. The full Policy Statement is included as an appendix in Washington Post Co.
v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 776-78 (D.D.C. 1972). This policy was modified by
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT 1220.6/7300.96, IN-
MATE CORRESPONDENCE AND INTERVIEWS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS AND
NEws MEDIA, June 10, 1974. Personal interviews may now be requested by either an
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The reporter and the Washington Post brought an action to enjoin the
enforcement of this regulation.22 The district court held that the policy
statement violated the First Amendment rights of the press.2 3 The court,
inmate or a member of the press. See Policy Statement, supra note 1, for those classi-
fied as members of the press. The inmates affected by the modification were limited
to those at youth centers and adult minimum security facilities. There are five major
reasons which permit the chief executive officer of the institution to deny requests for
press interviews. § 4(d) (4). First, the interview may be denied if the news media rep-
resentative fails to agree to conditions established by the policy (such as a failure to
make a reasonable attempt to verify an allegation regarding an inmate, staff member
or institution. § 4(f) (3)). The second reason is a doctor's diagnosis that granting the
interview would endanger the health of the inmate or the health or safety of the inter-
viewer or that the inmate is mentally unable to give a rational factual statement. The
third reason an interview request may be denied is that the inmate is under the age of
eighteen and no written consent has been obtained from the parents or guardian. If
the juvenile's parents or guardian are not known, the media representative is to be noti-
fied of the inmate's status and the requested interview shall be considered by the insti-
tution's chief executive officer after receiving the inmate's consent. The fourth reason
for denying an interview request is if, in the opinion of the institution's chief executive
officer, the interview would probably canse serious unrest or the institution's good order
would be disturbed. Finally, the requested interview may be denied if a court has issued
a gag rule in a court action in which the inmate is involved. An interview may also
be disapproved, of course, when in the opinion of the institution's chief executive officer
an internal emergency exists. § 4(d) (5).
22. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972); stayed
pending appeal, 406 U.S. 912 (1972); modified, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
granted su nom., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 415 U.S. 956 (1974).
23. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972). The
first decision by the district court, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972), began with the as-
sumption that "the need to grant substantial press access to prisoners is readily apparent.
Prisons are public institutions. The conduct of these institutions is a matter of public
concern." Id. at 772-73. The court found the total ban on press interviews in all insti-
tutions to be arbitrary on its face. Id. at 773. It then sought to determine whether
the government had employed the least restrictive means of limiting the First Amend-
ment freedoms of the press and inmates. (Government curtailment of an individual's or
group's First Amendment rights must be done by the least restrictive means consistent
with the legitimate goals of the government. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968). The test is applied to determine whether a statute or regulation is, on its
face, overly broad. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HAv. L. Rnv. 844 (1970).) The district court found no cause to distin-
guish whether it was the rights of the inmate or the press which were possibly infringed
by the regulation, since both parties were willing to communicate. Furthermore, the
public's right to be informed might overshadow both of those interests.
The court found a multitude of factors leading to its conclusion that the government
had not employed the least restrictive means of limiting the press' First Amendment
rights. These findings included the fact that many other jurisdictions permitted press
access to inmates, that as many as 90 percent of the inmates were incarcerated for
nonviolent crimes, that successful reintegration of inmates into society would be fur-
thered by the public being kept informed by the press of developments in this area, and
that institutions and inmates can readily be differentiated. The court found the govern-
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however, asserted that the public's right to be informed (which together
with the right to gather information comprises the right to know) over-
shadowed the rights of the press. The court of appeals modified and
affirmed.2 4 Holding that the regulations did not infringe upon any First
Amendment ,rights of the press, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the lower court.25
The press plaintiffs in Pell and Saxbe claimed that the regulations
of the prison authorities abridged their First Amendment right to gather
news without governmental interference. 2  The state of California and
the Federal Bureau of Prisons offered three justifications for the policy
of banning personal interviews with specific inmates: (1) the "big
ment's assertion that possible security and discipline problems might arise, and that "big
wheels" could be created, insufficient to justify the total ban on personal interviews. The
court held, therefore, that the total ban infringed unconstitutionally on the press' First
Amendment rights. On remand, the court adhered to its prior decsion, concluding that
"private personal interviews are essential to accurate and effectivc reporting. Ethical
newspapers rarely publish articles based on unconfirmed letter communications. Relia-
bility of such information must be determined by face-to-face confrontation." 357 F.
Supp. 779, 781 (D.D.C. 1972). The "big wheel" theory was specifically found inade-
quate to justify the total ban on press interviews because most "big Nx heels" were identifi-
able in advance and interviews with these inmates could be requested and granted spe-
cially. Id.
For an extensive discussion of the lower court decisions in Pc11 and Saxbe see Sig-
nificant Developments, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech and of the Press:
Prison Regulation Limiting Press Access to Prisoners Held Unconstitutional, 54 B.U.L.
REv. 670 (1974).
24. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
26. Prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Pell and Saxbe, lower court decisions
had varied as to restrictions on press access to prisoners. The following cases required
that press access be permitted: Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370) F. Supp. 1135 (D.
Mass. 1974) (enjoining the enforcement of Policy Statement 1220.1A and permitting an
interview by a newspaper reporter); McMillan v. Carlson, 369 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Mass.
1973), vacated and remanded, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1974) (enjoining enforcement of
Policy Statement 1220.1A and permitting interview by an author): Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (requiring press access
to federal prisoners held in county jails); Burnham v. Oswald. 342 F. Supp. 880
(W.D.N.Y. 1972) (press interviews with consenting inmates must be permitted absent
a clear and present danger). Cases which upheld restrictions on prcss access are Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973) (state pro-
hibition of press interviews at maximum security institution is valid); Mitford v. Pickett,
363 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ill. 1973) (Policy Statement 1220.lA is constitutional where
sufficient opportunity to correspond by mail exists); Smith v. Bounds (E.D.N.C. Mar.
10, 1972), 1 PRISON L. Rpm. 144 (1972) (interview ban within discretion of prison
officials since inmates are permitted sufficient opportunity to correspond with news-
men); Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F. Supp. 1128 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) (following a riot the
denial of press interviews does not abridge ,the First Amendment rights of newsmen);
Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971) (state prison regulation condition-
ing press interviews upon approval of warden is proper),
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wheel" theory,2 7 (2) the policy of uniform treatment to all inmates and
(3) the administrative burden that would be incurred from processing
applications for interviews and defending decisions to deny requests
which were challenged.
Majority Opinion in Pell v. Procunier
The majority in Pells began its opinion by stressing that the pur-
pose of the regulation in question was not to conceal prison conditions
since the press enjoys access to many aspects of prison functionings not
granted to the general public.29 With regard to any attempt to keep the
opinions of the inmates from the public, the Court emphasized that the
press is allowed to interview ° inmates selected at random by prison offi-
cials or to interview the members of any prison program as to any as-
pect of that program. The correction officials' strongest justification in
the lower court for its regulation had been the "big wheel" theory. The
majority in Pell gave weight to the "big wheel" theory but because of
the analysis of the issues it employed, a decision was never reached
as to whether this theory could justify the total ban on personal inter-
views.
The majority in Pell, as well as in Saxbe, relied on dicta from both
Branzburg v. Hayes"1 and Zemel v. Rusk32 in reaching its decision. The
27. A "big wheel" is the characterization given to an inmate who exerts an inordi-
nate amount of power and influence upon other inmates within an instituiton. By allow-
ing press interviews with "big wheels" the discipline, security and rehabilitative efforts
of the prison administration allegedly would be hampered. The added prestige given to
the "big wheels" through an interview would increase their ability to encourage other
inmates to engage in disruptive actions. The lower courts in both Pell and Saxbe re-
jected this as sufficient justification for the total ban on press interviews with inmates.
But see Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971) ("big wheel" theory found
sufficient to justify denying a press interview with a particular inmate where the regula-
tions expressly permitted interviews with specific inmates upon prior approval by the
warden).
28. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
29. Id. at 830. The press was permitted to visit the maximum and medium secu-
rity sections of any institution and could talk to any inmate they might randomly en-
counter. If security conditions would not be jeopardized, the conversation might be in
private.
30. Although the majority used the words "interview" and "conversation" inter-
changeably in describing the privilege given to the press of face-to-face communication
between the press and an inmate, there is a distinction. The court of appeals in Wash-
ington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974), considered the dif-
ference and found that a conversation is a spontaneous discussion with an inmate ran-
domly encountered during a visit to the institution. The subject matter of a conversation
is limited to "institutional facilities, programs, and activities." Id. at 998. Also, the
reporter is requested not to name any inmate with whom he might speak.
An interview is a "private, scheduled, face-to-face discussion" without limitation as
to topic coverage that lasts for sufficient time to allow extensive discourse. Id. at 998.
31. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
32. 381U.S. 1 (1965).
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Branzburg case consolidated four federal and state court cases. 33 The
principle issue was whether or not the requirement that newsmen appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries with regard to information
confidentially obtained by reporters violates the freedoms of speech or
press under the First Amendment. 4 The Court held that the rights of the
reporter were not abridged. Using a balancing test it found the public
interest both in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury
proceedings was sufficent to "override the consequential, but uncertain,
burden on news gathering that is said to result"35 from requiring report-
ers to answer the relevant questions of the grand jury. The evidence had
failed to demonstrate that requiring the testimony of the reporters would
lead to "a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public."3"
Thus the Court upheld the power to compel relevant testimony of a
reporter regarding information confidentially obtained.3"
Turning to the second case considered by the Pell majority brings
us to a brief review of Zemel v. Rusk.38 That case involved in part a de-
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The first two cases were Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), and Branzburg v. Meigs, an unreported opinion of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. In these cases Branzburg, a reporter for a nex spaper in Louisville,
claimed that he was privileged under the First Amendment to withhold from the state
grand jury information he had gathered. This information concerned the use, manu-
facture and sale of marijuana and hashish and had been gathered on two separate occa-
sions from confidential sources of information and from confidential personal observa-
tion. Branzburg's claim was rejected by the state court. 408 U.S. at 667-71.
The third case, In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), involved the
claims of Pappas, a reporter for a New Bedford, Massachusetts television station. He
claimed he had a First Amendment right to withhold from a state grand jury confidential
information concerning what he had seen and heard as well as the identities of persons
he had met during a three hour stay inside the local Black Panther Party headquarters.
The Massachusetts state court rejected the claims of Pappas. 408 U.S. at 672-75.
In the fourth case, Caldwell v. ,United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), Cald-
well, a reporter for the New York Times, asserted a constitutional privilege to withhold
from a federal grand jury confidential information as to the aims, purposes and activities
of the Black Panther Party. The Ninth Circuit held that absent compelling reasons for
requiring his testimony, Caldwell was privileged to withhold the information. Further-
more, absent a special showing of necessity, Caldwell was privileg-ed to refuse attend-
ance at the grand jury meeting. 408 U.S. at 675-79.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions in Branzburg and Pappas and reversed
in Caldwell. Id. at 708-09.
34. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
35. Id. at 690-91.
36. Id. at 693.
37. Id. at 708-09. For a further discussion of Branzburg in relation to access to
interview inmates, see Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branz-
burg and Mandel, 82 YALE L.J 1337, 1350-54 (1973) (concluding that the decision of
the district court in Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C.
1972), was correct in light of the Branzburg decision).
38. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Zemel, a private United States citizen, had been denied
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termination of whether or not a refusal by the United States secretary of
state to validate a passport for traveling to Cuba denied the plaintiff any
First Amendment rights. In balancing the individual's right of travel
against the needs of the government, the Court found the restriction on
travel to be "supported by the weightiest considerations of national se-
curity.""9 In dicta the Court stated that as to the denial of the alleged
right to learn about the Castro regime, "[the right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." 0
The refusal to validate the passport for travel to Cuba was, moreover,
held to be a restraint on action rather than speech and thus only relevant
to a consideration of whether or not Zemel was denied due process under
the Fifth Amendment. No First Amendment rights were thus at issue.41
In attempting to distinguish their case from Branzburg, the press
plaintiffs in Pell tried to frame their claims of infringement of First
Amendment rights in terms other than those used by the reporters in
Branzburg. Whereas the Court in Branzburg had found that the burden
on newsgathering which resulted from compelling the testimony of re-
porters to be "consequential, but uncertain, ' 42 the press in Pell claimed
the total ban on personal interviews imposed by the California regula-
tion was both consequential and certain in its burden upon news gather-
ing.43 The plaintiffs further argued that when employing a balancing
test of competing interests the state could not show any substantial gov-
validation of his passport for travel to Cuba by the United States secretary of state.
Zemel contended, among other things, that "the travel ban is a direct interference with
the First Amendment rights of citizens to travel abroad so that they might acquaint
themselves at first hand with the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign
and domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect such policies." Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 16. The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, had occurred less than
two months before Zemel filed his complaint. Id. at 16.
40. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). See Note, Constitutional Law: Resolv-
ing Conflict Between the Right to Travel and Implementation of Foreign Policy, 1966
DUKE L.J. 233 (critical of the standard of review used by the Court in Zemel and argu-
ing that the result may substantially diminish First Amendment rights when the right
to gather information is denied); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information,
71 CoLum. L. Rlv. 838, 846 (1971) (suggesting that the result in Zemel might have
been different if a journalist rather than a private citizen had been denied validation).
41. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
126-27 (1958) as support in finding that the right to travel is protected by the Fifth
Amendment.
42. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
43. See Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branzburg and
Mandel, 82 YALE LJ. 1337, 1352 (1973) (concluding that the direct restriction on news
gathering in Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (1972), unlike the
indirect restriction in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), made irrelevant any
proof of a causal link between the restriction and the resulting inhibition on the news
flow as required by Branzburg).
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ernmental interest in a total ban.44 The majority gave these contentions
by the press only brief mention and then proceeded to formulate its
reasoning from dicta extracted from the Branzburg and Zemel cases.
While recognizing that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections" 45 since "without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,"4 6 the Court
took care to point out that "[tihe right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information."47 In its dis-
cussion, the Court stated that whatever First Amendment protections
the press possessed, relating to the right to gather information, they were
no greater than those of the general public.48 In this case, since the gener-
al public was denied access to inmates to conduct personal interviews,
the denial to the press of access abridged no rights of the press under the
First Amendment: "[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access
to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."4
Thus the California prison regulation prohibiting any personal inter-
views with inmates was upheld as constitutional by the Court.5"
Majority Opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.
On the federal level Saxbe5 ' presented the same issue raised by the
press in Pell, namely, the right of the press to gather information from
face-to-face interviews with specifically designated consenting inmates.
The federal regulation52 banned ali personal interviews by the press as
did the California regulation 53 in Pell. The press in Saxbe asserted, as
did the press in Pell, that the First Amendment protections of news gath-
44. In First Amendment controversies, where there are incidental limitations on
the First Amendment, the Court has required that the government show a sufficiently
important interest and that the limitation be accomplished by the least restrictive means.
See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J 464 (1969).
45. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
46. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
47. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 n.9 (1974), quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
48. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974).
49. Id. at 834.
50. Id. at 835.
51. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
52. U.S. BuREAu OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT 1220.1A § 4b(6).
53. CALIF. DEP'T OF CoRRECTIONS, ADmiNIsr,&TrvE MANuAL § 415.16.
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ering by the press, which the Court recognized in Branzburg, were
abridged by the ban on all personal interviews by the press.54
The majority prefaced its reasoning in the case by acknowledging
that the press had privileges of special access similar to those accorded
the press by the correction officials in Pell. 5 The majority, moreover.
felt as in Pell, that great deference was due the argument of the correc-
tional authorities that allowing press interviews would create "big
wheels." '56
In Saxbe the Court found the limitation on permissible visitors"r
justified by a "truism" acknowledged by the court of appeals: "[P]ri-
sons are institutions where public access is generally limited." ' Finding
the issues raised by the press in Saxbe to be constitutionally indistin-
guishable from those raised by the press in Pell, the Court utilized its
reasoning in Pell to support a decision against the press in Saxbe. Thus
the existence of a constitutionally protected right to gather news was
acknowledged.5 9 The Court in a cursory statement then found that the
general public was legitimately denied access to prisons and their in-
mates. 60 This point had not been raised by the majority in Pell although
its essentiality to the reasoning of the majority is unquestionable. With-
out this finding the majority rationale would still leave the constitution-
ality of the regulation at issue since the general public might not be con-
stitutionally denied personal interviews with inmates. If this were so,
then any attempt to uphold a denial of press access by referring to the
public's access would fail. As the Court saw the general public to be
legitimately denied access to prisons and their inmates, it found no valid-
ity in the claim that the First Amendment rights of the press had been
abridged since, as declared in Pell, a newsman's constitutional right of
access to prisons or their inmates was no greater than the public's right. 1
The Supreme Court thus reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
54. See text accompanying notes 42-4 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
56. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974). The "big wheel"
theory is discussed in note 27 supra.
57. Visitation policy is controlled by the U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, BUREAU OF PRIS-
ONS, POLICY STATEMENT 7300.4A, Visiting Regulations, April 24, 1972. The Policy
Statement is set out in full as an appendix in McMillan v. Carlson, 369 F. Supp. 1182,
1189-95 (D. Mass. 1973). Essentially, it provides that permissible visitors include
members of the inmate's immediate family (para. 5(e) (1)), certain other relatives (para.
5(e)(2)), genuine friends and associates (para. 5(e)(3)), clergymen, former or pro-
spective employers, sponsors and parole advisors (para. 5(e) (7)).
58. 417 U.S. at 849, quoting Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994,
999 (1974). See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966).
59. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
60. Id. at 849.
61. Id. at 850.
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Dissenting Opinions of Pel and Saxbe
Justices Powell and Douglas each wrote a dissenting opinion appli-
cable to both Pell v. Procunier62 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 3
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Powell
The dissenting opinion of Justice Powell8 4 considered the issues
raised by the press in Pell and Saxbe within the factual context of Saxbe.
Powell would affirm the lower court holding in Saxbe that the regulation
prohibiting all press interviews with inmates was unconstitutional. 5 He
would, however, remand the case with instructions to permit the govern-
ment to adopt written standard regulations regarding press interviews.
In Pell, the justice would reverse that portion of the lower court decision
which held the total ban on press interviews constitutional. 66
Justice Powell's concluding remarks are best stated at the begin-
ning of this examination of his opinion, as they reveal the essence of his
approach to the issue under discussion. According to Justice Powelrs
view, the majority is content to establish the First Amendment protec-
tions of the press as freedom of speech, a prohibition of governmental
prior restraints on publication and a nondiscriminatory right of the press
to gather information vis-d-vis the general public.61 Justice Powell sees
this as determining only the outer boundaries of First Amendment con-
cerns and believes that if First Amendment protections of the press are to
maintain viability in a changing society the Court must "enter the thicket
of a particular factual context in order to determine the effect on First
Amendment values of a nondiscriminatory restraint on press access to
information."6 8 To avoid this duty and follow the course of the majority
is to permit, in Justice Powell's opinion, the erosion of First Amendment
freedoms in an evolving society where absolute guarantees are not possi-
ble.
Although the subject is discussed more fully in the latter portion of
this note, an understanding of the differences between the reasoning of
the majority and Justice Powell is facilitated by brief discussion of the
fundamentally different view of the press taken by each opinion. With
respect to any issue raising constitutional rights to gather information,
the majority views the press as existing separately from, but on the same
62. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
63. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
64. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
65. Id. at 874.
66. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
67. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 875 (1974).
68. Id.
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footing, as the public at large. The rights of the press to gather informa-
tion are simply a mirror of the rights accorded the general public.69 Thus
the conclusion in Pell and Saxbe, that the press presented no viable
claims of an abridgement of their First Amendment rights, follows logi-
cally from the finding that the public at large had been constitutionally
denied the right to have personal interviews with inmates.
The approach taken by Justice Powell asserts, on the other hand,
that the general public's right to know is of paramount importance in
any claim by the press of an independent right to gather information. His
view of the role of the press within the functionings of American society
differs from that of the majority in that the press is viewed as an entity
whose right to gather information may exist within the general public's
right to know. Rather than paralleling the rights of the general public,
the press, in Justice Powell's view, is in the position of a vertical
subgroup of the general public. At the minimum, the press has the right,
accorded by the majority, to gather information which is granted to the
general public. The majority and Justice Powell disagree, however,
whenever the general public at large has been denied the right to gather
information. The rights of the press according to the majority cease at
that point,7" but in Justice Powelrs view the issue is not completely
settled. In a position of the vertical subgroup of the general public,
permitting the press to gather information is viewed as a possible less
drastic means of curtailing the general public's right to gather informa-
tion than a total denial of the right.71 Justice Powell, therefore, finds
the burden imposed upon the government to be more stringent when
it attempts to justify denying the press the right to gather information
than when it denies that right to the general public. The press could
be denied the right to gather information only upon an independant
showing by the government of a compelling state interest. This process
gives the government a less drastic means of achieving its compelling
interest than a total curtailment of the right to know. The press might
in some instances, then, possess rights to gather information greater
than those of any individual member of the general public.
The Effect of Banning Prison Interviews
Turning to Justice Powell's examination of the nature and effect of
the total ban on personal interviews with inmates, he notes testimo-
ny in the district court to the effect that personal interviews were "crucial
69. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 90-93 infra. See Note, The Rights of the Public
and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 1505, 1525 (1974) (asserting
that permitting the press to gather information could be considered as one less restrictive
means of limiting the public's right to gather information from voluntary sources).
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to effective reporting in the prison context." 72 Justice Powell likened the
reliance of a newsman on personal interviews to the reliance of an attor-
ney upon cross-examination: each is indispensable in the pursuit of
truth and accuracy.
Justice Powell also examined in detail the distinction between "in-
terviews," which were denied, and "conversations," which were permit-
ted.73 He agreed with the lower courts that "conversations" were not a
viable alternative to personal interviews with designated inmates. In
support of his conclusion, Justice Powell noted that an inmate qualified
to speak on the subject being investigated by a newsman might not be
encountered by that newsman on his tour of the prison. Even if the re-
porter met a qualified speaker, the inmate might feel pressured by the
presence of other prisoners to give distorted account of the subject mat-
ter and emphasize rhetoric rather than hard facts.
Noting that the government did not argue at length against the
district court's finding that personal interviews by the press were "essen-
tial to accurate and effective reporting"' Justice Powell moved to the
next part of his dissent: the goverment's contentions that the denial of
press interviews raised no constitutional issues.
The Constitutional Questions
Upon examining the claims by the Washington Post that the First
Amendment protects dissemination and acquisition of news, Justice
Powell found the reasoning of the majority to be faulty in that it gave too
broad a reading to the Branzburg and Zemel cases.
Justice Powell viewed any attempt to use the conduct versus speech
categories developed in Zene 7 5 as creating distinctions without sub-
stance when examining the claims of the press in Pell and Saxbe. 6
Stressing that the United States v. O'Brien77 Court did not consider the
72. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 853 (1974). The district court
had received the testimony on remand of the case to consider the "extent to which the
accurate and effective reporting of news has a critical dependence upon the opportunity
for private personal interviews." 477 F.2d 1168, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony
was obtained from three reporters, two journalists and an attorney, and emphasized that
"[t]hose [reporters] who do publish without interviews are likely to print inaccurate,
incomplete, and sometimes jaundiced news items." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., supra
at 854.
73. For a discussion of the distinction between "interviews" and "conversations"
see note 30 supra.
74. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 856 (1974).
75. The Court in Zemel saw the restriction on travel to Cuba as a restraint on
action rather than on speech and thus found no First Amendment ri-hts in issue. Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
76. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 858-59 (1974).
77. 39 TJ,S. 367 (1968) (the government's prohibition of burning selective service
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conduct versus speech distinction to be an all-embracing standard in
determining if First Amendment rights were in issue, Justice Powell
found Zemel of no help in these cases.
Justice Powell noted that the Branzburg Court had recognized that
newsgathering qualified for some protection under the First Amend-
ment. He saw, however, an unwarranted extension of Branzburg devel-
oped by the majority in Pell and Saxbe that was caused by a misreading
of the Court's analysis in Branzburg.7 8 Only if dicta from Branzburg
were read in isolation might the result reached by the majority in Pell and
Saxbe be supported by that case. The Court in Branzburg had used a
balancing test of competing interests to determine if the reporters could
be compelled to testify at grand jury proceedings as to information confi-
dentially received. 79 The result in Branzburg had hinged on this balanc-
ing test "rather than on any determination that First Amendment free-
doms were not implicated." 80
The First Amendment claim in Branzburg, Pell and Saxbe was the
right to gather information. Although in Branzburg the public had no
right to withhold from the grand jury confidentially received informa-
tion, the Court did not decide that the press claim presented no First
Amendment issue. But in Pell and Saxbe, the Court found that the press
did not present a First Amendment claim because the general public was
denied access to prisons for personal interviews with inmates. The ma-
jority in Pell and Saxbe essentially used Branzburg to support their hold-
ing that the press presented no First Amendment claim, without em-
ploying the balancing test of competing interests utilized in Branzburg.
The differences, therefore, of the facts and issues in Branzburg and Ze-
mel from those in Pell and Saxbe, and the analysis used by the Court in
Branzburg and Zemel, convinced Justice Powell that it was proper to
consider independently the constitutionality of the government's regula-
tion prohibiting all press interviews with prisoners.
Justice Powell first sought to determine whether the Bureau of
Prisons' regulations and the challenge by the press gave rise to a question
certificates is constitutional even though the prohibition of conduct may involve First
Amendment issues of free speech).
78. Justice Powell's vote was necessary to form a majority in Branzburg. Although
he joined in the opinion of the Court he also wrote a concurring opinion, 408 U.S. 665,
709 (1972), to emphasize what seemed to him "to be the limited nature of the Court's
holding." Id. "The asserted claim to privilege should be judged ...by the striking
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct." Id. at 710.
79. The interests of the general public in effective law enforcement and grand jury
proceedings outweighed the burden on the constitutionally protected right to gather news.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
80. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860 (1974).
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of "constitutional dimensions."' What constitutional rights were po-
tentially being abridged by the total ban on personal interviews? Justice
Powell rested his analysis upon the theory of Professor Chafees2 who
viewed freedom of speech and of the press as protecting two kinds of
interests: the individual interest and the societal interest."3 The individ-
ual interest is in "individual expression and personal self-fulfillment,"s
and is protected by barring governmental restraints on speech or publi-
cation. As the government's regulations in Pell and Saxbe infringed
upon no individual interest of the press, the character of Chafee's socie-
tal interest was scrutinized. The societal interest encompasses the right
of the public to discuss the affairs of their government" which is essen-
tial if an informed populace is to be created which will maintain a gov-
ernment reflecting the public's true desires.8 6  Protection of the social
interest of the First Amendment must therefore encompass the right to
express and receive ideas. 87 To facilitate the effective operation of the
societal interest, Justice Powell saw the press as being utilized as a con-
duit "by which people receive that free flow of information and ideas
essential to intelligent self-government.188 For Justice Powell, the role
of the press as it relates to the societal interest is that of an agent for the
general public.
The important conclusions in Justice Powell's analysis follow from
the role he assigns to the press. If the press is to serve as an effective agent
of the general public in fulfilling its purpose of informing the public, the
press must in some instances have access to information not directly
accessible by the general public.89 Justice Powell accepted the argument
that there are good reasons for not permitting unrestrained public access
81. Id. at 856.
82. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH ix THE UNITED STA.TES (1967).
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id., as quoted in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974).
A vital First Amendment interest is in assuring "self-fulfillment [of expression] for each
individual." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
85. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974).
86. "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-exprzssion; it is the es-
sence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See
Hart, The Congressional Perspective of Competition in the Communications Industries,
13 ANTITRUST BULL. 973 (1968) (America's strength is the unhindered exchange of
many ideas and these ideas will live only to the extent they are communicated). See
note 125 infra.
87. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmas-
ter Gen'l, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943). See note 11 supra.
88. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974). See notes 86-87
supra.
89. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974).
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to the prisons and their inmates. 90 He found, however, that the general
public does have the right to a free flow of information concerning pub-
lic institutions. The question then arose of whether or not there is equal
justification for denying the press access to inmates for interviews in its
capacity as an agent for the general public acting to exercise the public's
right to obtain information. Justice Powell saw no legitimate govern-
ment interest in preventing the press from acquiring any information
which they might obtain by a personal interview with an inmate. The
regulation's effect was to ban a method of "news gathering that is essen-
tial to effective reporting in the prison context 91 thus preventing "ac-
curate and effective reporting on prison conditions and inmate griev-
ances." 92 The government's regulation, therefore, infringed upon the
general public's right to a free flow of information encompassed within
the societal interest guarantees of the First Amendment. Justice Powell
concluded that the regulation must be measured against rights guaran-
teed by the First Amendment.
The Bureau of Prisons' Justifications and a
Standard of First Amendment Review
Turning to the case of Procunier v. Martinez,93 Justice Powell con-
sidered that case's prison mail regulation which limited the First
Amendment rights of nonprisoners. Since the regulations in Pell and
Saxbe also concerned prison regulations limiting the First Amendment
rights of nonprisoners, Justice Powell adopted for these cases the First
Amendment standard of review established by the Court in Procunier v.
Martinez.94 The requirements of this standard are:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression . . . . Second, the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved. 95
Justice Powell accepted the lower courts' finding that the govern-
ment's interest in security, discipline and rehabilitation of inmates was,
under the Martinez case, a "substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of expression."9 He also accepted the finding that
these interests could be disrupted by prison interviews on the basis of the
"big wheel" theory. However, the "big wheel" theory was not sufficient
90. id. at 864.
91. Id. at 861.
92. Id. at 860-61.
93. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 413.
96. Id.
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justification for the total ban on press interviews with specific willing
inmates. Justice Powell was persuaded that the total ban violated the
second part of the test and was, therefore, unconstitutional as an overly
broad limitation on First Amendment rights.
First, at most only 5 to 10 percent of the inmate population were
troublemakers 7 and because of the requisite leadership qualities all
prison troublemakers would not become "big wheels." Thus, the num-
ber of "big wheels" with whom the prison administrators had a legiti-
mate concern would be less than the number of prison troublemakers.
Second, the government did not show it was unable to ascertain in ad-
vance of any press interview which inmate would be a disruptive "big
wheel." Finally, of the twenty-four jurisdictions having written policy
regulations concerning press interviews with inmates, only five states
(including California) totally prohibited press interviews with consent-
ing inmates.9 8 In Saxbe the district court had compared the prison sys-
tems in states permitting press interviews to those denying interviews
and found no evidence to support a conclusion that prison systems deny-
ing press interviews faced problems any more severe than jurisdictions
permitting press interviews.
Toward A Constitutional Interview Policy
Having found the government regulation unconstitutional as an
overly broad limitation of First Amendment rights, Justice Powell delin-
eated what limitations he thought the government could constitutionally
impose on press interviews. The government's actions would be subject
to a First Amendment standard of review only where those actions sig-
nificantly curtailed the free flow of information to the general public.99
Not every regulation of press interviews with inmates would significant-
ly impede the flow of information. Thus, there was no impediment to the
government adopting standard written regulations regarding press in-
terviews rather than implementing the ad hoc balancing test of compet-
ing interests with each request for an interview as required by the lower
courts. Such a written policy could include regulations on the time, place
and manner of interviews as is done with other visitors. The number of
interviews with an inmate within a certain time period could be limited
to guard against the creation of "big wheels." The government could
also prohibit interviews with inmates under temporary disciplinary mea-
sures and prohibit all interviews during an institutional crisis. Justice
Powell concluded that standard written regulations would allay the gov-
ernment's fears that an ad hoc balancing test, as ordered by the lower
97. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 868 (1974).
98. Id. at 869 and nn.13 & 14.
99. Id. at 871-72.
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courts in Saxbe, would cause disruption in prison discipline and rehabil-
itation. Finally, a written standard policy would avoid the difficulties of
a case-by-case determination of who is a member of the press while still
preserving the constitutional right of the general public to a free flow of
information.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas would reverse 00 the holding in Pell as it relates to
the claims of the press' and affirm the judgments of the lower courts in
Saxbe. 0 2 The source of his disagreement with the majority opinion rests
on the characterization of the interests involved in the two cases. Justice
Douglas reasserts his statements made in dissent in Branzburg v.
Hayes,10 3 that the guarantee of a free press protects not only the interests
of the media but extends protection to the general public's right to
know. 0 4 Thus, the total ban on personal interviews is a limitation on the
First Amendment rights of a free press. The issue, therefore, becomes
the same as it was for Justice Powell: does the total ban exceed what is
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the prison authorities and
thus infringe on the guarantee of a free press?10 5
Justice Douglas agreed with the lower courts in Saxbe that prison
authorities may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions
on interviews, without imposing a total ban, in order to protect the legiti-
mate governmental interests of discipline and security. He found the
regulations prohibiting all personal interviews to be too broad and thus
unconstitutional. 06
Justice Douglas' reasoning rests on his clarification of the dangers
he perceived, and which Justice Powell had also sought to expose, un-
derlying the majority's opinion. He asserted that the general public
might easily be denied access for interviews with the inmates because
there are few practical hardships involved and very few individuals
would personally seek to investigate the prison system. But it does not
follow from this that the general public lacks the desire to be informed on
prison conditions and policies. Justice Douglas emphasized that prisons,
being public institutions, are the responsibility of the general public.
100. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 836 (1974). Justice Douglas was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall in this dissent which also applies to Saxbe.
101. Id. at 841. Justice Douglas would also affirm the lower court's holding in Pell
as it related to the claims by the inmate plaintiffs. Id.
102. Id. at 842.
103. 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972).
104. Id. at 721, quoted in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974).
105. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 872 (1974).
106. Pell v. Propunier 417 U.S. 817, 841-42 (1974).
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With 1.5 million people 07 under the authority of federal, state and local
prisons at a cost of one billion dollars annually, 10 8 the public's interest in
being informed upon this public activity is "paramount."'1 9 Thus to as-
sert, as the majority does, that the press can automatically be denied the
right to gather information once the general public at large has been
denied it,1 0 is dangerous. By not permitting the press to have access
to information as a less drastic means of limiting the general public's
right to gather information, the government is provided with an awe-
some ability to curtail the general public's right to be informed.
The Role of the Press-Past and Present
The next part of this note will briefly examine the character and
role of the press at the time the First Amendment became part of the
Constitution," followed by a discussion of the press as it has existed in
recent years. Next, statements by the Supreme Court, and its members
individually, which shed light on the Court's view of the character and
role of the press prior to Pell and Saxbe will be examined. Finally, these
three parts will be compared to the opinions by the majority and dissen-
ters on the freedom of the press issue in Pell and Saxbe. By this process
this note seeks to accomplish two goals: first, to expose the apparently
new view of the role of the press taken by the Supreme Court and;
second, to show that the evolution of the character and role of the press
to its current activities argues for the reasoning and result of the dis-
senters in Pell and Saxbe. Although the survey is brief, it is done in
the belief that a representative sampling of facts and opinions in each
area of discussion is sufficient. Utilizing a pure additive process would
not change the conclusions arrived at through the sampling process.
The Character of the Press in the Revolutionary Period.
Between 1776 and 1810 the press included the newspaper and the
pamphlet. Because of slow transportation and circulation, the impact of
the press upon society, although powerful,"12 was generally limited to
the locality of the editor." 3 Thus, any news from outside that locality
was never "current" news.
107. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974).
108. Id. at 840.
109. Id.
110. See text accompanying notes 47-50 and 57-61 supra.
111. "The first ten Amendments-The Bill of Rights-were submitted together in
1791; ratification was completed on December 15, 1791." G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING,
CASES AND MATERIAS ON CONSTITunoNAL LAw lxxxiv n* (8th ed. 1970).
112. See S. KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL NEWSPAPER 168 (1944);
A. SCHLESINGER, PRELuDE TO INDEPENDENCE 44 n.68 (1957).
113. See M. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDom 589 (1946).
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Little was written during the revolutionary period on the charac-
ter of the press. However, the few comments made in this regard give
some insight into this question. James Madison said:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every
thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press.11 4
Writing in 1807 Thomas Jefferson stated:
Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper . . .
the man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than
he who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to
the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods & errors. 11 5
Jefferson's conviction of the necessity of the press to preserve a free
nation was undaunted, however:
The way to prevent these irregular interpositions .[acts toward
tyranny] of the people is to give them full information of their af-
fairs thro' the channel of the public papers, & to contrive that those
papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.11 6
The Sedition Act" 7 was the federal government's first major at-
tempt to curb the First Amendment freedoms of the press. Although the
constitutionality of the act was never determined by the Supreme Court,
the debate at that time sheds light on the character of the press. John
Allen of Connecticut, in the House of Representatives, upon opening
debate in support of the act requested that:
gentlemen look at certain papers printed in this city and elsewhere.
and ask themselves whether an unwarranted and dangerous com-
bination does not exist to overturn and ruin the Government by
publishing the most shameless falsehoods against the Representa-
tives of the people of all denominations .... 118
Jefferson opposed the act but seemed to find no error in the charac-
terization of the press made by Allen. Jefferson, however, blamed the
state of the press upon the federalists who had pushed the press'
licentiousness & it's [sic] lying to such a degree of prostitution as to
deprive it of all credit . . . . [E]ven the least informed of the
people have learnt that nothing in a newspaper is to be believed." 9
114. 4 ELLIoT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNvENTIONS ON THE ADop-
TON OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (2d ed. 1876), in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell, June 14, 1807, in C. PATER-
SON, THE CONSTrrUrIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135 n.14 (1953).
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, in C. PAT-
TERSON, THE CoNsTrrUTIoNAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 186 (1953).
117. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
118. 8 ANNALS OF CoNO. 2093-94 (1798), in E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN AMERICA 46 (1963).
119. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean, Feb. 19, 1803, in E. Hu-
DON, F REEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 47-48 (1963).
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In essence, the press could hardly be viewed as providing an objective
account of newsworthy events. The publications of the times provided a
forum for politicians and editors to express their partisan views on issues
of the day2 on a wider scale than was possible by mere speech. The
press became the instrument through which political parties could ap-
plaud their own actions or condemn those of their opponents. 2 ' Yet the
essentiality of a free press was not questioned in the revolutionary
times. 2 ' Although First Amendment rights for the press may always to
some degree be limited,.28 the minimal protection afforded by the Con-
stitution prohibited the federal government from imposing prior re-
straints on publication.' 24 Without uninhibited public exposure to the
many shades of opinion presented in the press, the theory of a govern-
ment acting to fulfill the people's true desires is clearly a mere hope.
The press' character in the revolutionary period was dominated by
its editorial nature.12 5 The press as an objective reporter of news was a
rare, if not nonexistent, creature. When we realize the character of the
press, we see its role as one which permitted people to express, and have
access to, opinions of wider dissemination than speech afforded. The
reader, however, was expected to realize without editorial acknowledge-
ment that any fact in the printed matter was most likely submerged be-
neath a barrage of less than objective assertions.
The Nature of the Press Today
To attempt to state definitively the character and role of the press in
modern society would inevitably lead to injecting personal opinion and
120. See E. EMERY, ThE PRESS ANDAMERICA 68 (1962); S. KOBRE, FOUNDATIONS
OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 77 (1958).
121. See W. CHENERY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 143-45 (1955); W. HOCKING, FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS 12-13 (1947).
122. James Madison said: "A popular Government, without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Gov-
ernors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 723 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
123. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-85 (1964) (First
Amendment rights are not absolute); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1965).
124. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Ol-
son, 283 U.S. 697, 716-17 (1931). See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 165 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion, giving an ex-
tensive discussion of prior restraint). See also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Re-
straint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 648, 659-69 (1955).
125. See text accompanying notes 113-22 supra.
[Vol. 2
thus potential error. For the purpose of this note, however, the general
public's expectation of the press in recent times and the press' attempts to
satisfy them, may be compared with the character and role of the press in
the revolutionary period.
It is readily apparent that the general public today has certain ex-
pectations of the press, such as editorial comment, 2 6 which are similar
to the public's expectations in the revolutionary period. Technology and
advances in education, however, have created a wide schism between the
public of the two time periods as to the expected scope of press presenta-
tion of news. The development of radio, television and the virtually in-
stant transmission of information have made press activities in recent
times qualitatively different from that which existed in the revolutionary
period. 127 One major result has been a press which strives for objectivity
and balance in the reporting of news, 12 that is, the separation of report-
ing news as an objective observer from editorializing.
The individual member of the general public knows the physical, if
not economic, impossibility of personally ascertaining the facts of all
events he might consider important to his welfare or appealing to his
desire to be well informed on local, national and international events. An
information gap would arise today if an individual could act only upon
information which he obtained through a press similar in character to
the one that existed in the revolutionary period. Thus, the economic ne-
cessity of the press to respond to the desires of its subscribers,' 29 coupled
with an increasing public reliance upon the press as the public's primary
source of information,3 0 has caused the press' character to change.
126. Congress sought to aid the maintenance of diverse editorial commentary in
newspapers by enacting the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1971).
This act liberalized the antitrust restrictions on newspaper combinations. One prerequi-
site for two newspapers to enter into a joint operating agreement (a common reason for
this action being economics) is that the two newspapers maintain autonomous editorial
and reportorial policies. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1971).
127. "The various forms of modem so-called 'mass-communications' raise issues that
were not implied in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin
and Jefferson and Madison." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
128. See K. COOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 25-29, 42-47 (1956). Roger Fisher
(Professor of law, Harvard University) states there is great ambiguity in references by
newspaper and television people to "professionalism." ASPEN NOTEBOOK ON GovuN-
mENT AND THE MEDIA 78 (W. Rivers & M. Nyhan ed. 1973). The standard for young
reporters seems to be "accuracy, unbiased reporting, [and] presentation of the hard facts
." Id. The standard for leaders of the profession seems to be "sage comments
and reasoned opinions on major questions of the day." Id.
129. See K. CooPER, THE RIGHT TO KNoW 27-28 (1956) (giving the character
change of the Associated Press as an example of the press' response to the economics
of a change in readers' desires).
130. The electronic media are the "public's prime source of information." H.R.
RP. No. 91-257, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969). According to a Roper survey, tele-
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Whether or not this change is supported by the First Amendment, it has
in fact resulted in the press exercising the public's right to gather infor-
mation (one aspect of the right to know). 131
By the end of the nineteenth century the wide political spectrum of
newspaper readers tended to encourage objective reporting of newswor-
thy events.'3 2 With the creation of large news agencies such as the Asso-
ciated Press and United Press International, to which many newspapers
subscribed, a subscriber risked exposure by a competitor or possible ex-
pulsion from the agency, if it chose to inject its own political emphasis
into the agency's report. Through the pooling of resources from the sub-
scribers, the scope of coverage of newsworthy events around the world is
now greater than any one newspaper could hope to provide. Because
subscribing newspapers are thus tied to larger news agencies, the general
public ends up receiving greater information on newsworthy events than
any individual could possibly obtain from a newspaper relying solely on
its own resources or through personal investigation.
vision is the primary source of news for 60 percent of Americans over the age of 21,
TELEviSION 3 (B. Cole ed. 1970). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 386 n.15 (1969) (acknowledging the press as the public's primary source of news).
131. A recent example of the press gathering information for the public was in re-
gard to the "Watergate" affair. According to a Louis Harris poll, Americans, by 56
percent to 18 percent, believed that if not for the press' exposes the Watergate scandal
would not have been uncovered. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1973, at 20, col. 6.
Several states have provided by statute that in various situations the press is to be
permitted to gather information while the general public is denied this right. The press,
therefore, gathers information for the general public who receives its information from
the press.
Press representatives are often part of a very limited group allowed to be present
at executions. E.g., N.J. STT. ANN. § 2A:165-66 (1971); Omo REv. CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 2949.25 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1125 (1964).
Oregon provides that the press is allowed to attend executive sessions of any govern-
ing body whereas the general public may be excluded. ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.660(4)
(197-3).
Some states accord the press special office space in legislative buildings. E.g., ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 342 (1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 331.120 (1973).
Several states grant the press special rights to be admitted on the floor of the legis-
lature. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2-51 (1958); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit.
3, § 341 (1964).
Indiana provides that election results must be furnished to the press immediately
after the results are certified. IND. STAT. ANN. 3-1-25-7 (1971).
Some states permit the press to be present in voting polls whereas the general pub-
lic is prohibited except to vote. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 9-236 (Supp.
1974-75); IND. STAT. ANN. 3-1-23-24 (1971).
Connecticut expressly permits the press to remain on the floor of the legislature
when the general public has been cleared from the galleries. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2, § 2-1(c)(7) (Supp. 1974-75).
132. K. CooPEin, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 26-28 (1956).
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When television serves as a provider of news,' the public also
expects a certain objectivity in reporting. Because there are relatively
few television and radio stations, laws have been enacted to ensure that
the public receives a balanced view of current events. Stations must be
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission 34 and the fair-
ness doctrine 35 requires each station licensee to provide balanced pro-
gramming of opinions on controversial issues. In theory, noncontrover-
sial events are presented objectively and controversial issues are treated
as such, with the opinion of advocates of various positions accurately
reported.
If the press is viewed as an entity which responds to the demands
made upon it by the general public, it is evident that it serves at least in
part as the primary gatherer and presenter of news for the public. In this
capacity the press is the practical filler of the general public's potential
information gap.
The Supreme Court's View of the Press Prior to PeU and Saxbe
Comment by the Court and various justices upon the character and
role of the press in American society has been relatively recent. In 1907
the Court was presented for the first time'3 6 with a case in which a news-
paper asserted First Amendment rights.'3 Justice Holmes spoke for the
Court and limited his comments to the First Amendment protections
given to the press.
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions [the First
Amendment] is "to prevent all such previous restraints upon publi-
cations as had been practiced by other governments," and they do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare.' 38
Twenty-five years later the Court began to articulate a more expan-
sive view of First Amendment protections extending to the press. Chief
Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson'39 acknowledged that
133. See note 130 supra.
134. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307.
135. In 1959, Congress amended § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 to give
express statutory approval to the Federal Communication Commission's fairness doc-
trine. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934).
For a summary of the development and nature of the fairness doctrine see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (reviewing and approving Red
Lion); Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print
Media, 26 HAST. L.. 659 (1975).
136. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. R.v. 838,
840 (1971).
137. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
138. Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
139. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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historically freedom of the press had meant primarily immunity from
previous restraint or censorship. 140 In light of the changing character
and role of the press, a wider scope of protection under the guarantee of a
free press was now required because, the "conception of the liberty of the
press in this country had broadened with the exigencies of the colonial
period and with the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive adminis-
tration."' 1 The Court, following the tradition of Madison who had
praised the press at length,142 perceived the indebtedness of the Ameri-
can public to the press to be as great now as it was in revolutionary times.
The Court took up the cause of the press again in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.,148 the first major exposition of its views of the
press' character and role.
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is
safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the pub-
lic and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality
of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent
of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridge-
ment of the publicity afforded a free press cannot be regarded
otherwise than with grave concern. 144
The free press in the Court's opinion had to be considered "a vital source
of public information [which] stands as one of the great interpreters
between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to
fetter ourselves."' 48 Essentially, the press was acknowledged to be the
general public's primary instrument for obtaining local, national and
international news.' 46 Although not expressly stated by the Court, the
140. Id. at 716.
141. Id. at 716-17.
142. Id. at 717-18. For the statement by Madison see text accompanying note 7
supra.
143. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
144. Id. at 250.
145. Id. at 250.
146. In Associated Press v. United States (326 U.S. 1, 26 (1945)) Justice Frank-
furter (concurring opinion) echoed this view of the press in commenting on the charac-
ter and role of the Associated Press in the United States. 'The historic development
of this agency, its world-wide scope, the pervasive influence it exerts in obtaining and
disseminating information, the country's dependence upon it for news of the world-
all these are matters of common knowledge and have been abundantly spread upon the
records of this Court. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918); Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1936)." "The business of the
press . . . is the promotion of truth regarding public matters by furnishing the basis for
an understanding of them." Id. at 28.
The press has also been viewed as serving as a "marketplace of ideas." See, e.g.,
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting opinion).
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logical corollary was that the press was also a vital gatherer of news for
the general public.
The Court in the 1960's expanded the views expressed in Grosiean
v. American Press Co.14 7 and stressed the close ties between the First
Amendment rights of the general public and the press and the press' role
in protecting these rights. The Court stated in Mills v. Alabama148 that
the press was specifically selected in the Constitution to serve as an
antidote to abuses of power by government officials and to keep them
responsible to all the people. 4 9 The First Amendment guarantee of
a free press was "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us."'' 10 The Court has since affirmed that the public
benefit is information and that the press is the general public's primary
source of this benefit.'
Declaring on many occasions that the free flow of information to
the general public is essential for a democracy to function,152 the Court
has recognized that it is essential to protect the process of providing the
general public with information." 3 In Branzburg v. Hayes,'" the Court
expressly recognized that the newsgathering function of the press quali-
fied for First Amendment protection 55 because "without some protec-
tion for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerat-
ed."' 6 In summary, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
press, as the primary provider of information to the public, is entitled
to First Amendment protection in the gathering and dissemination of
news. The Court, furthermore, has recognized that the general public
147. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
148. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
149. Id. at 219.
150. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
151. "The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and
inform the people." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring opinion).
152. On the essential role in a democracy of a free exchange of information, see,
e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931). On the importance of a free flow of information, see, e.g.,
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US. 233, 243 (1936). See also Z. CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNrED STATES 6 (1941); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA-
TION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 88-89 (1948).
153. "We have often described the process of informing the public as the core pur-
pose of the constitutional guarantee of speech and a free press. See, e.g., Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365; Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 153." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.1 (1972) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting).
154. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
155. Id. at 681, 707.
156, Id, at 681.
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is the beneficiary of the press' activities and the protections extended
to those activities.
A Comparison of the Reasoning of the Majority and
the Dissenters in Pell and Saxbe
In Pell and Saxbe the majority viewed the press as an entity existing
separately from the public when it measured the press' right to gather
information against the general public's right to gather information.
The Court concluded that once the general public's right to gather infor-
mation had been legitimately curtailed, a press challenge to the restric-
tion did not present a First Amendment question. 157 The press could not
exercise the public's right to gather information. Therefore, the Court
did not consider permitting the press to gather information as a possible
less drastic means of restricting the public's right to gather information
than total curtailment of the right.
In criticism of the majority's reasoning, the Court's decision in Pell
and Saxbe fails to recognize the evolution of the press, and departs from
past Court statements regarding the press' character and role in Ameri-
can society. The press as the public's primary source of news158 strives to
provide the public with information which will permit intelligent analy-
sis of current issues. Viewing the press as a representative of the general
public in gathering news would merely acknowledge reality. The cur-
rent character of the press demonstrates that its role is to present infor-
mation for the public's, not the press', benefit.' 59 Similarly, the press
does not gather information for itself, i.e., to keep just itself informed; it
gathers information for presentation to the public. The majority in Pell
and Saxbe frustrates attempts by the press to maximize the amount of
information which it could gather and present to the public. To allow the
press to fulfill its role of gathering and presenting information for the
public requires that the press be viewed in the same position of fulfilling
the public's right to know when it gathers information for the public as
when it presents information to the public.
The Court prior to Pell and Saxbe had recognized the evolving
character and role of the press,' and acknowledged that the press' ac-
tivity of informing the general public was a "core purpose" of the First
Amendment' 6 ' benefiting the entire public and not just the press. How-
157. See text accompanying notes 48-50 and 61 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 143-51 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 124-33 and 150-51 supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 136-56 supra.
161. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.1 (1972), as quoted supra at note
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ever, the Court in Pell and Saxbe ignored the press' role in fulfilling the
public's corollary right to gather information, thus implying that the
Court would not recognize the press' role in fulfilling the public's right to
know when the right to gather information was in issue.
The possible ramifications of the majority's reasoning upon the
ability of the public to obtain information are severe. The net result of
the public's inability to utilize the press as a means of exercising the
public's right to gather information is a limitation of the press' role of
providing information to the general public. The practical effect is that
the right to know is curtailed. Both the majority and the dissenting jus-
tices in Pell and Saxbe agreed that the general public at large was justifia-
bly denied access to personal interviews with inmates. 162 Unlike the ma-
jority, however, the dissenters viewed the press as a subgroup of the
general public, thus perceiving that permitting the press to have access
was a less drastic means of restricting the public's right to know than
totally curtailing the right. The dissenters found the government's justi-
fications insufficient to deny access to the press by considering whether
or not there was separate sufficient justification for denying the press
access to gather information. The majority's failure to utilize the ap-
proach of the dissenters, particularly the detailed opinion of Justice
Powell, evidenced a failure to see, or a disregard of, the impact of the
character and role of the press within American society.
The dissenters considered the public's right to know paramount,
and viewed the rights of the press in the context of attempting to fulfill
that right to know. Thus, the dissenters recognized that restrictions on
the press' right to gather information limited the public's right to know 6"
since the millions of recipients to whom the press would have provided
information lost some of their power to know.
Conclusion
The major question underlying the different reasoning used by the
majority and dissenters in Pell and Saxbe may be stated thus: when does
the general public lose the right to gather information and, therefore, a
portion of its right to know? The majority believed the right to be lost
when the general public, viewed independently of the press, lost the right
to gather information. The dissenters saw the public's right lost when the
press lost the right to gather information. It has been the purpose of this
note to suggest that the evolution of the press' character and role within
162. The majority so found in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849
(1974). Justice Powell agreed with this view in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 857.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, implied this view in Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 841 (1974).
163. See text accompanying notes 82-96 and 100-05 supra.
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American society, and the Court's past statements acknowledging this
evolution, argue for the dissenters' position in Pell and Saxbe. When the
press loses the right to gather information the general public effectively
loses that right and, therefore, a part of its right to know. Maintaining the
press' role of providing information for the public requires that the
courts consider permitting the press to gather information as a possible
less drastic means of curtailing the public's right to gather information
whenever the government puts forward a justification for restricting
public access.
